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The intellectual justification for modern central banking, time-inconsistency, celebrates its 40th 
anniversary in 2017 alongside the Cambridge Journal of Economics. However, the key progeny of the 
time-inconsistency literature, central bank independence, has fundamental flaws that have been thus 
far neglected in mainstream research. In the first instance, the argument for independence relies on a 
utilitarian rather than institutional analysis, one that neglects the genesis of central banks and their 
relation to other institutions within a country. Secondly, central bank independence neglects the 
complex interdependencies of the global monetary and financial system. Applying an institutional lens 
to the concept of central bank independence, I conclude that “independence” fails under the reality of 
globalization as much as it does in a domestic context. With central banks reliant on all manner of 
political institutions, they are never really independent operationally or in terms of policy.   
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1. Introduction  
Much like the Cambridge Journal of Economics, the intellectual justification for modern central banking, 
the idea of time-inconsistency as defined in Kydland and Prescott (1977), also turns forty years old in 
2017. While not touching upon central banking explicitly, the Kydland and Prescott paper provided an 
intellectual framework which could be applied to monetary policy and, in particular, the arrangement of 
monetary institutions. Famously refined by Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985), the persistence 
of time-inconsistency pointed to shifting the institutional role of central banks in developing monetary 
policy, moving central banks (as Keynes had suggested at the very beginning of modern central banking) 
“outside the regular Government ‘machine’” (Keynes 1914:160). 
 
Kydland and Prescott’s model thus begat the modern conception of “central bank independence” (CBI), 
an idea which had already existed for decades; indeed, CBI was mooted at the very beginning of modern 
central banking pre-World War I (Keynes 1914), with considerable leeway given to banks in the inter-
war era (Kisch and Elkin 1928, Simmons 1996). Moreover, the organizational issues underpinning CBI 
were highlighted during major struggles between central banks and state treasuries for power during 
the post-war era (Stein 1969). But both theoretically and practically, the basis for CBI in the mainstream 
economics literature prior to 1977 tended to be narrowly focused on execution rather than institutions, 
concentrating on policy independence from the state treasury or instrument independence to use 
specific tools to control the money supply (Wray 2007).  
 
By contrast, the stagflation of the 1970s and the apparent impotence of central banks in the developed 
world occasioned a reshaping of the CBI debate, with Kydland and Prescott providing a theoretical basis 
for this change. Subsequent research such as Cukierman (1992) focused on CBI as an institutional 
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arrangement that could effectively insulate monetary authorities from political pressures, an 
arrangement which was truer in spirit to Keynes’ (1914) original conception, albeit in service of a 
potentially different goal. With policymakers shifting incredibly quickly to an almost-uniform acceptance 
of political independence of central banks (Forder 2005a), a subsequent plethora of empirical evidence 
was produced showing CBI consistently delivered better inflationary outcomes, with no negative effects 
observed between CBI and growth (nor for that matter, positive effects, as shown in Alesina and 
Summers 1993). With both theoretical backing and apparent empirical success, central bank 
independence appeared to many mainstream economists as the optimal solution against time-
inconsistency. 
 
However, even with these apparent economic successes, there is good reason to believe that the 
modern practice of central bank independence does not actually solve the time-inconsistency problem 
as mooted by Kydland and Prescott. As Forder (1998:10) accurately noted, central bank independence is 
an institutional solution to an incentives issue, and “whenever an institutional proposal - such as central 
bank independence - is proposed as a solution to a time-consistency problem, there is the danger that 
the problem is simply relocated, or displaced.” Unfortunately, an appraisal of this institutional possibility 
has been lost in the mainstream CBI literature, mainly because the extant research on independence has 
somehow managed to champion an institutional arrangement without making any recourse to 
institutional analysis. Indeed, mainstream economic and policy thought about CBI has studiously 
avoided insights from new institutional economics (NIE) in even understanding the core point on just 
how a central bank might actually be “independent,” and how it might not be. In short, how can we talk 




This omission is troubling, given the reality that a central bank is, by definition, a monetary institution 
embedded within a broader system of economic and political institutions, both domestically and 
internationally. Moreover, the institutional nature of a central bank means that it is not insulated from 
political pressure or “power struggles” (de Haan and Eijffinger 2016), merely that the pressure takes a 
different form than with a Ministry of Finance or parliament; one can make the case (as I do) that 
political pressures and interests are constantly pulling at the institution of the central bank despite any 
intended insulation, with modern central banks very sensitive to one domestic interest especially, that 
of the financial sector (Wray 2007). By ignoring the reality of a central bank as an institution within an 
institutional system, the debate on CBI has been skewed towards a myopic obsession on “what function 
[a central bank] should perform” (Giannini 1995:217) – or, more accurately given the CBI literature, on 
how to avoid actions that it would have the power to implement – instead of a focus on the normative 
reason for a central bank’s existence (“why it should exist”). Such an approach also overlooks how one 
should understand the efficacy of modern central banking vis a vis alternatives, if the time-consistency 
issue is truly to be overcome. Without taking an institutionalist lens to the structure of monetary policy, 
the CBI debate has remained devoid of critical analysis. 
  
The purpose of this paper is thus to rectify this omission in the central bank independence literature and 
re-examine the modern idea of “independence,” but through an institutional lens. The institutional basis 
of CBI has been touched upon before in pluralist economic research, mainly from Forder (1996, 1998, 
2005a) and Bibow (2004), but the events of and response to the global financial crisis call for an updated 
and much more explicitly institutionalist examination. Drawing on insights from NIE and new 
institutionalism, I show in this paper that the idea of CBI does not live up to the lofty claims of the early 
modern central bank literature, and in particular the time-inconsistency issues of Kydland and Prescott, 
a point made earlier by Bibow (2004 and 2013a). However, my argument deviates from Bibow (2013a) 
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by showing specifically it is the overall domestic institutional framework that a central bank emerges 
which makes the entire concept of central bank “independence” a mirage, as political pressures are 
omnipresent and exert a powerful influence on the policies undertaken. This reality exists even for that 
rare central bank creature unmoored from (direct) democracy, the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Additionally, I show that political pressures are not limited to the domestic arena, as the growing 
globalization of monetary policy has also constrained central banks externally in their operations and 
their policies, forcing convergence in both. My conclusion is that true central bank independence is a 
goal which can never be achieved within the conventional approach to centralized monetary 
institutions, with true independence, if desired, only feasible via different (and radical) institutional 
alternatives.  
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: the following section explores the genesis of the concept of 
“central bank independence,” focusing not only on its various facets over the past forty years but its 
original conception in the pre-, inter-, and post-war era. Section 3 then critiques the modern 
interpretation of central bank independence using the tenets of new institutional economics, with a 
focus on the realities of institutional endogeneity and the concurrent growth of financialization in 
developed countries; Section 4 continues this critique but expands it to include the reality of policy 
globalization over the past four decades, and how this has also constrained central bank independence. 
Section 5 concludes with some final thoughts on central banks as institutions and what this means for a 
post-financial crisis world.   
 
2. Central Bank Independence: Genesis of a Concept 
As Sawyer (2006:640) correctly notes, “central bank independence is not a notion that was suggested 
for the first time by Kydland and Prescott.” Indeed, a shift in the emphasis of central banks in the early 
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20th century towards currency supervision and economic stability and away from the role of “banker to 
the government” (Blancheton 2016) also precipitated a change in thought on the institutional nature of 
the central bank.  At the core of the debate was the question of how a central bank would operate 
within existing political structures, and whether the conduct of monetary policy should be entirely 
separate from other economic policy implementers (Forder 2005a).  
 
Some of the earliest thoughts on this topic came from Keynes during his days in the India office of the 
British Foreign Service, where he formed the belief that “it was not meaningful to make monetary policy 
prescriptions without a clear prior formulation of the institutional framework of central banking…[as] 
the scope and limitations of the instruments of central banks are determined by institutions” 
(Chandavarkar 1989:101).  Working to determine the optimal arrangement for the conduct of monetary 
policy in the prize of the dominion, Keynes asserted that the establishment of a central bank in India 
should rely on private ownership as a “bulwark against some kinds of political pressure” (Keynes 
1913:160), with the bank itself under expert control to guard against governmental interference in the 
execution of policy. However, Keynes made clear that this independence he envisaged was severely 
limited, as there would be government appointment of representatives to the board and “ultimate 
responsibility for the currency would… be vested in the state” (Bibow 2002:758). Thus, the central bank 
would be entrusted to experts, due to the technical nature of monetary policy, but it would remain 
firmly enmeshed as an instrument of the state (Bibow 2013a). 
 
Despite central banks having considerable leeway as custodians of the gold standard in the pre-war era, 
this technical independence was wholly subordinated to the financing needs for fighting a global war 
(Toniolo 2010). However, central banks were able to reclaim independence in the post-World War I 
world (Sawyer 2006), where the monetary hangover of the war and the descent into inflation (and 
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hyperinflation) in many countries made a return to independence an attractive alternative. 
Independence was explicitly supported by the Brussels Financial Conference of 1920 under the auspices 
of the League of Nations, which resolved that “banks of issue should be freed from political pressure and 
should be conducted solely on the lines of prudent finance.” Indeed, the practice of CBI in the interwar 
period went far beyond what Keynes had counseled (and would continue to counsel against), with 
bankers such as Emile Moreau of France and Montagu Norman, the governor of the Bank of England, 
“totally challenging the legitimacy of political intervention in monetary affairs” (Blancheton 2016:102).  
 
But while central bank independence was kept in place by the force of personalities in France and the 
UK, elsewhere on the continent, especially in countries forged after the Great War, independence was 
far shorter-lived (see Hartwell [2016] for the example of Poland). The onset of global financial crisis and 
the neo-mercantilism of the mid-1930s was followed quickly by another global conflict, as governments 
swept aside nominal independence and subordinated central banks to their own policy choices; in fact, 
in many countries, “soft nationalization” of the banks was used to bring currency issuance under the 
control of the government (Toniolo 2010). The rise of fascism, communism, and other strains of 
authoritarianism meant that Keynes’ developing ideas on the technical nature of central bank 
independence (Bibow 2002) were quickly overtaken by events. 
 
Unlike the aftermath of the First World War, as Capie (1994:55) correctly notes, “the period from the 
Second World War until around 1970 was another period of great growth in central banking but on this 
occasion the desired and pursued relationship was of relative closeness – dependence.” While there 
were notable exceptions during this period (the Accord between the US Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve in 1951 freed the Fed from monetizing US government debt) and even intellectual challenges 
from economists such as Milton Friedman (see Bibow 2013b), these moves were short-lived; the 
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emphasis on full employment made the central bank a crucial player in implementing government 
policy, and central bank independence was whittled away during the 1960s (Meltzer 2009). I 
 
It was not until the dire economic conditions of the 1970s that the concept of central bank 
independence was reborn. Much like its first wave in the 1920s, the attention paid to independence fifty 
years later was driven by pervasive inflation and the sense that the post-war monetary model was failing 
to deliver either stability or growth. Unlike the earlier Keynesian emphasis on the technical nature of 
central banking, research on CBI shifted towards the microeconomic incentives of monetary policy and, 
especially, policymakers. Typified in Kydland and Prescott (1977), the idea of “dynamic inconsistency” 
was extended by Barro and Gordon (1983) to show how monetary policymakers could be enticed by a 
theoretical short-term boost to employment from inflation. Given the time-inconsistency between when 
employment increased and when inflation materialized, a politician might never face the consequences 
of this decision (but would reap the benefits via re-election). However, labor markets also understood 
the incentives of policymakers, and thus inflationary expectations would already be built into the 
system; in fact, if there were perfect knowledge on the size and scope of a policymaker’s intent to 
inflate, the theoretical boost from inflation to employment would never materialize, but inflation 
continuously would. Even with imperfect knowledge, the common knowledge regarding policymaker 
incentives in the labor market could result in high levels of inflation for little gain.i 
 
To fight against such an eventuality, an economy had to either change the incentives for a central 
banker to create inflation or, more dramatically, remove discretionary the power entirely from the 
hands of policymakers. The first approach was attempted in the “rules versus discretion” debate, as 
papers such as Barro and Gordon (1983) suggested that binding rules would lead to better inflationary 
outcomes. In a similar vein, Rogoff (1985) showed that appointing more conservative policymakers 
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would somehow overcome the incentives provided by an institutional system that rewarded inflation 
with little punishment. But while these workarounds appeared to address the time-inconsistency 
problem, even the authors of these papers acknowledged that policy rules, no matter how well-crafted, 
could not stop policymakers from falling prey to the political process (and their own incentives). As 
Alesina and Grilli (1992) noted, the populace could ex post wipe out gains of the conservative banker by 
“recalling” him with someone more amenable to inflationary temptations (although their model 
presupposes direct democracy in the election of a bank governor).  
 
Given this reality, it appeared important to shift from the personalities running the monetary system to 
instead focus on the design of the institutions themselves. Much like the theorists and policymakers of 
the 1920s, economists began to model how changes in the administration of policy would help to 
insulate banks and bankers from the political pressures that were inherent in monetary policy. Papers 
such as Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman (1992) came down on the side of greater legal independence 
for monetary authorities, positing that de jure independence could be the solution against politicized 
monetary policy. These (and many other) papers theorized that, with no direct political linkages, an 
independent central bank would have no incentive to deliver temporary boosts to the economy via 
inflation, nor would it have an incentive to inflate away debt (having no control over budgetary 
matters).  
 
Such legal “independence” could manifest itself in one of two ways: the first, “instrument 
independence,” meant a central bank had “control over the levers of monetary policy and [was] allowed 
to use them” (Fischer 1996:202). Such an approach was in line with earlier conceptions of 
independence, as it represented a technocratic approach to the technical issues of monetary policy. 
However, the second form of independence, “goal independence”, was a radical departure from pre-
10 
 
war Keynesian ideas of CBI, as it allowed a central bank to set its own policy goals, divorced from 
broader government desires. In reality, the optimal mix of these two types of independence has not 
been conclusively decided in the literature, with some researchers focusing on the benefits of 
instrument independence alone (Fischer 1996 and Siklos 2008), while others advocated for full goal 
independence (Baltensperger et al. 2007). Regardless of the specific allocation between these two types 
of independence, the conjunction of goal and instrument independence would resolve the time-
inconsistency issues and thus deliver better macroeconomic outcomes than the alternative (as Bibow 
[2004] noted, providing policymakers with a seemingly “free lunch”).  
 
This recommended institutional reform of monetary policy was soon adopted throughout developed 
and, eventually, emerging economies, as it offered a compact theoretical explanation and an easy 
administrative fix to avoid inflation. A wealth of empirical evidence was also marshalled in favor of 
independence, with work from inter alia Cukierman et al. (1992), Brumm (2002), and Klomp and de 
Haan (2010) finding a strong negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation 
and no correlation with output volatility (Cukierman 2008).ii With central bank independence 
established as the leading institutional arrangement for monetary policy, not even empirical evidence to 
the contrary (Forder 1996, Hayo 1998) or (massive) hiccups such as the global financial crisis could cause 
a re-evaluation of the tenets behind CBI (Quiggin [2009] is a notable mainstream exception). Indeed, the 
onset of the crisis and its aftermath only strengthened the resolve of bankers to maintain their 
independence while aggrandizing more policy power (Bernanke 2010), with unconventional monetary 
policy, expanded mandates, and forays into financial regulation (Cukierman 2013). But even though the 
reasoning behind independence may have strayed far afield from its modern theoretical basis, the 
momentum propelling CBI has been maintained or even increased since the crisis. As Blinder (2010:124) 
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put it in a moment of hubris, “I will neither elucidate nor defend the arguments for central bank 




3. A Critique of CBI (Part I): How Can We Talk about Institutions without Mentioning 
Institutions? 
 
Unfortunately for Professor Blinder, economics is rarely a settled science, especially when a concept 
(such as central bank independence) exhibits major theoretical and practical flaws. The issue at the 
heart of central bank independence is that, as noted above, it is an institutional solution to an incentives 
issue, and thus must be evaluated using tools of institutional analysis. Unfortunately, the clear majority 
of the literature examining CBI focuses on incentives exclusively, leaving central bank independence as 
an institutional “black box” in which incentives go in and then are magically transformed coming out. 
Such an approach ignores the institutional mechanisms of “independence” and how a central bank 
might mitigate time-inconsistency, in particular neglecting the institutional genesis of a central bank and 
its purported role; how it functions in relation to other political and economic institutions within an 
institutional system; and how independence itself acts (or does not) as an institutional mechanism.  
 
The starting point for understanding a central bank as its own institution is understanding how this 
particular institutional arrangement is birthed out of a pre-existing institutional structure, and what 
ramifications it has for making such an institution “independent.” The approach prevalent in the 
mainstream literature merely notes that a central bank is an institution (see, for example, Romer and 
Romer 1997), but is more concerned with what issues it should overcome rather than what a monetary 
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policy institution should do (and arguing from this first principle various suppositions on the institution’s 
organization and placement within a complex institutional web). This question, of the role of the central 
bank in its institutional system, is incredibly important if one considers that any monetary policy and 
especially inflation preferences will be driven by the incentives of society and its political institutions and 
not controlled by just one institution. As Mas (1995:1639) pointed out, “a country’s inflation record and 
central bank institutional arrangement are both shaped in part by political forces bearing on 
government.”  
 
This is directly counter to the mainstream CBI literature, which adheres to the erroneous assumption 
that the incentive to inflate is independent of a country’s political institutional structure and only 
accrues to one specific class, that of the politician. But an economy’s problems are very rarely 
exogenous, and, in the particular case of inflation, the incentives of political creatures and the polity are 
endogenous to the system. Put more explicitly, the political system of democracy itself creates the 
incentive structure for a pandering central bank (or politician) to inflate the money supply, in order to 
receive more votes, approval, or economic returns. As an institution constructed by democratic forces, 
the “independent” central bank faces the same incentives as the democracy it emerged from. 
 
Given these inherent incentives, the modern conception of central bank independence tries to 
somehow tie the bulk of the polity’s own hands, removing from itself the temptation to generate 
inflations (generally narrowly defined as price levels but, in earlier papers, also referring to the money 
supply) for evanescent gains. Indeed, if the political institutions of democracy did not generate the 
economic incentive to create inflation, an independent central bank would not necessarily be 
“required,” as the temptation would not exist. But as Alesina and Grilli (1992) already showed, voters 
can be crafty in pushing their inflation preferences if given a direct say in the bank’s operations, and thus 
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more intricate ways to remove temptation must be found. Seen in this light, the creation of an 
independent central bank must necessarily flow from a country’s overarching political institutions, 
specifically the extent of a country’s democracy and the ability of a polity to vote itself inflationary gains. 
Some evidence can be found for this assertion, as shown in Figure 1: the countries that have the highest 
central bank independence on average also are rated as the most “democratic” on the Polity IV scale (a 
point also made by Bagheri and Habibi 1998).iii Democracies create independent central banks, but 
democracies also create the need for “independent” central banks. 
 



































-10 -5 0 5 10
Polity_IV
n = 993
Average Central Bank Independence = .43314 + .00604 Polity_IV
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Polity IV and Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) 
 
The institutional endogeneity of inflationary preferences is overlooked in the empirical evidence on CBI 
more generally, due to its emphasis on macroeconomic outcomes rather than institutional ones 
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(Watson 2002). While this is an understandable emphasis – if we assume lower inflation means that 
time-inconsistency has been taken care of, there is no need to trace the process institutionally – it has 
obscured the possibility that perhaps it is not the endowment of independence to a single pre-existing 
institution which delivers lower inflationary outcomes, but the fact that inflationary preferences have 
already shifted within society due to other reasons (Hayo 1998).iv Mas (1995) takes such an argument to 
its logical conclusion, noting that CBI itself is needed least where it is most likely to succeed, given that 
the conditions for low inflation and/or fiscal rectitude are already present. Put another way, if the 
central bank as an institution already reflects the institutional make-up of a society, shifts in the entire 
institutional system could create a different incentive structure (and thus inflationary outcomes). This 
reality is also directly contra to Issing’s (2013) assertion that an independent central bank is the 
guarantor of sound money, and if the state were to collapse, such an emphasis would be lost in anarchy; 
if the system were to collapse, the predilection for sound money would be the same as within the 
system, only the political institutions implementing this preference would no longer exist.  In fact, 
central bank independence may be the last institutional step, as other institutional reforms have likely 
already occurred to enable a low-inflation environment, including opening the political system to create 
multiple veto points (as shown in Figure 1 and noted in Keefer and Stasavage 2003). Such a reality may 
also account for the correlation between central bank independence and other desirable policy 
outcomes, such as fiscal rectitude (as shown in Bodea and Higashijima 2015).  
 
Of course, democracy is no more of a black box than a central bank, with a teeming mass of interests, 
classes, and incentives churning beneath the formal political institutions. While inflation-aversion can be 
anticipated from some segments of society (in particular savers and the poor, who survive on a cash 
basis), other segments may be in favor of various types of inflation, in particularly holders of assets, 
financiers, and bankers. These competing interests may be thrown out of balance by the presence of an 
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independent central bank, which tends to reward banks (as part of its own incentives) rather than 
savers: an early example of this comes from Roberts (1911), who argues as a banker forcefully for a 
central bank, noting that competition constrains banks’ ability to lend, and thus a lifeline from the 
state’s reserves would help banks to create more lending. Indeed, the growing financialization of 
advanced economies almost entirely and utterly in lockstep with the spread of CBI (Figure 2) suggests a 
reinforcing relationship between bankers and central bankers, with central bankers facing more 
pressure, not from politics or voters, but from banks themselves. This critique has been leveled 
repeatedly by Post-Keynesians, showing that once a central bank has removed its legal shackles from 
government, it tends towards to governance by bankers rather than the people, reaching beyond 
monetary policy to issues of deregulation and supervision (Epstein 1992, Levy 1995).   
 
Figure 2 – Central Bank Independence and the Share of Finance in Country GDP, OECD countries 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from OECD (share of financial sector) and Garriga (2016) for central bank 
independence. Figures shown are average of 20 OECD countries per year for both financial sector and CBI. 
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This does present us with a paradox, however, in that an anti-inflationary central bank cannot both 
pander to its constituents (the financial class) and to the polity at large, given their contradictory 
incentives. In advanced economies, it appears that this paradox has been neutralized via an odd sleight 
of hand. The official definition of “inflation” in “inflation-targeting” countries is narrowly centered on 
headline CPI (Hammond 2012), and thus the target of central banks is specialized in optimizing a loss 
function based on a specific underlying set of economic data (Svensson 2000).  By avoiding monetizing 
public debt, central banks have kept inflation (at least as measured by CPI) low, pleasing the polity 
overall. On the other hand, policies of low interest rates in order to generate credit have pushed 
inflation away from goods in the CPI basket and into asset prices instead, satisfying holders of assets and 
financiers. In this manner, central banks have created a “grand bargain” between financiers and society; 
so long as wages are not eroded by general price rises, savers are happy, while asset inflation keeps 
financiers content as well (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin [2011] detail the institutional drivers of this 
bargain). Intermittent economic busts are seen as just a consequence of the market economy, not a fact 
engineered by the central bank trying to please all of its constituents at once. 
 
This idea of a grand bargain raises another crucial point and that is that endogeneity runs both ways. 
Just because an independent central bank reflects societal preferences for lower inflation does not 
mean that the central bank will have no influence on that same institutional system. As Giannini 
(1995:217) notes, “it is… questionable whether one could deal with complex institutions--as central 
banks undeniably are--without taking into account their evolutionary logic.”  The reality is that central 
banks, no matter how “independent” they are designed, influence the institutions around them, 
including social trust (Berggren et al. 2016) and the exigencies of a democratic political system with 
checks and balance and which requires a peaceful transfer of power (Moser 1999; Farvaque 2002; 
Landström 2013). One need only look at the personalities of central bankers to understand that they too 
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are politicians, and they love adoration and acceptance as much as any President or Finance Minister 
(Alan Greenspan and his tarnished “rock star” status is a prime example of this). Their statutory goals 
may be different, but their incentives remain the same, shaped from the system from which they 
emerged.  
 
Such an incentive includes aggrandization of power: a commonly-leveled charge is that CBI subverts the 
very democratic system that it came out of (Levy 1995) by divorcing the far-ranging consequences of 
monetary policy from elected representatives. More problematic is the reality that “if a constitutionally 
sanctioned central bank refuses to cooperate and insists on taking into account only its own target, this 
[policy] becomes dominant (whether or not this was intended by the authors of the constitution). The 
central bank's monetary policy is no longer an instrument of government, but is rather a control upon it” 
(Arestis and Bain 1995:163). But even this state of affairs is derived from the political environment: 
McCallum (1997:107) makes this point in a neoclassical framework, stating that “the standard literature 
involves the notion that it is useful to conduct analysis, involving institutional design, under the 
presumption that central banks can have preferences that are systematically different from society’s.” 
 
This reality turns a common Post-Keynesian argument on its head: if a central bank is but an institutional 
expression of a prevailing institution system that is somehow supposed to act counter to that system, 
where then is its actual “independence?” That is, even though they may be legally “independent” from 
government, at no point is the central bank ever wholly insulated from politics, much less from market 
and societal institutions. In particular, as a political institution, staffed by political appointees, and 
having chosen a political approach to overcome economic problems (likely politically-determined), 
central banks are both political and economic institutions, nested within one set of political institutions 
(government), nested within another set of economic institutions (the institutions of the marketplace), 
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nested within the meta-institution of society and then even further embedded into an international 
system.   
 
In practice as well, the exigencies of monetary policy have required independent central banks to cede 
some of their goal independence in pursuit of political goals. This may be only natural, as central banks 
are not omnipotent, but it does call into question how either policy or instrument “independence” is 
supposed to work. As Quiggin (2009) asserted in a (perhaps-premature) polemic, CBI was effectively 
neutralized as a result of the global financial crisis, simply because crisis responses by definition required 
coordination between national treasuries and central bankers. Thus, while bankers may have wanted to 
be independent, there was no way to get around the need for dealing with Finance Ministries in 
developing a crisis response. McCallum (1997:106) accurately predicted this reality by noting that “rules 
cannot plausibly be made contingent on all conceivable types of shocks that might occur… in this case… 
it can be better to violate an incomplete state-contingent rule and implement the discretionary outcome 
in those periods in which some shock realization is unusually large and of an unanticipated type.” 
Lohmann (1992) also models this theoretically, anticipating Bibow’s (2004) point on rules v. discretion 
being a continuum rather than a choice, showing that some discretion is always retained in a crisis; 
presumably this discretion would also include intense coordination and less independence.  Capie and 
Wood (2013:379) were more explicit in their assessment on this issue, saying that “central bank 
independence never has survived a crisis and never can.” 
 
Given this situation, the political cycle may be the only true determinant of a bank’s independence, and 
thus the current favored solution for ensuring independence focuses on appointing directors of the bank 
by elected officials for longer-terms, so that electoral cycles are not concurrent with governor cycles 
(Crowe and Meade 2008). But such “independence” can only last until the next election (Mas 1995), and 
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the more democratic the society, the more the access points to influence central bank policies. 
Moreover, governments still retain some lever of power over central banks through control of their 
budgets (Beblavy 2003), a necessity in order to remove the central bank’s incentive to inflate in order to 
maximize its own profits (Mas 1995).  
 
In fact, the pervasive nature of a country institutional structure means that central banks will always be 
constrained and acted upon by government entities and society at large, as the same system that 
created an independent central bank to rein itself in can take away the independence. As Alesina and 
Grilli (1992) noted, a conservative central banker can be turned out by a populace that desires a little 
inflation now and then (although this may take some time), and even Walsh’s (1995) solution of a 
contract concluded with the central banker to create an “optimal” level” of inflation can be revised by 
the populace (or penalties lessened). As Hayo and Voigt (2008:752) correctly noted, “if government has 
the capacity to create a formally independent central bank, it might also be strong enough to overrule 
its decisions, simply ignore them, or abolish the independent central bank again.”  
 
This fact that is hinted at in Figure 3, where the highest levels of democracy correspond to lower CBI on 
average but including a quadratic term confirms a Kuznets Curve relationship between central bank 
independence and democracy. This adds credibility to the argument that the most highly democratic 
societies likely have pulled back on full-throttle central bank independence simply because they prefer 
the supposed benefits of inflationary bursts (higher employment, higher asset prices) in the here and 
now (or, as Lohmann [1992] notes, they prefer to have flexibility in a crisis). Even where a powerful and 
independent central bank seems to exert influence across the institutions of government, it too can be 
reined in by the democratic process; some empirical evidence for this fact has already been shown in 
Bodea and Higashijima (2015:3), who note that “even in democracies, central banks will pragmatically 
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guard their formal, de jure, independence by accommodating deficits under conditions related to the 
electoral calendar and government partisanship.” It appears that, given all of the ways in which the 
populace can exert an influence on monetary policy, in a clash between democracy (loosely meant to 
include the manifestation of majority will through elected and representative institutions) and central 
bank independence, independence will surely lose (Adolph 2013).  
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3.1 The Exception? The European Central Bank 
The one institution that appears to be the exception to the domestic institutional constraints rule is the 
European Central Bank (ECB), created by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and given “extreme 
independence… to reassure financial and business elites that price stability will trump other economic 
goals” (McNamara 2002:67).  In fact, the legal independence of the ECB is much more iron-clad than 
national central banks due mainly to the fact that its mandate is granted by the Treaty; given the 
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cumbersome process to alter Union-wide treaties, involving conventions, unanimity, and acquiescence 
of national governments, the ECB’s mandate is well-nigh untouchable. Such an extreme case of 
independence would thus also offer the perfect laboratory to see how well insulated the ECB is from 
political pressures of the governments of all Member States, the EC and European Parliament, and civil 
society.  
 
Despite the extreme legal independence that the ECB exhibits, it does not disprove the essence of the 
central bank as a political creature (Forder 2005b), as it too is constrained by the political institutions 
which gave it life (although these constraints affect the ECB to varying degrees). In the first instance, 
Magnette (2000) notes that the abdication of political oversight a posteriori has meant that political 
appointment assumes much more importance, and thus haggling over ECB board members is an 
important way for political pressure to be brought to bear. Similarly, even the ECB’s legal focus on price 
stability was derived from political institutions in Member States, mainly the dominance of the 
Bundesbank and its supporters in the German government, with the ECB’s mandate written in a way to 
secure German support for the institution (Bibow 2013b). Such a provenance leads to an interesting 
question, namely what would happen to the ECB if Germany were to severely disapprove of its policies? 
This question is less than theoretical, as Germany has indeed pushed back strongly against the ECB in 
the post-crisis period on a variety of fronts, including the Bundesbank, the German government (in 
particular the Finance Ministry), regional governments, and the German media. Given the oversized 
stature of Germany within the Eurozone, it is perhaps far-fetched to think that the safeguards of the TEU 
could prevent Germany from either effecting a change in the ECB, hindering ECB policy (as has actually 
happened) or, more drastically, leaving the euro altogether (leaving behind a theoretically independent 




But more important than the composition of the board is the reality that the ECB, as a supranational 
institution, it incredibly constrained by the democratically-chosen fiscal policies of the Member States. 
Indeed, the ECB lacks the luxury of the Fed in dealing with only one fiscal policy, and instead has to deal 
with 19 separate fiscal policies with the ability to render the ECB’s policies “impotent” (Demertzis et al. 
1999:217). While provisions such as the Stability and Growth Pact have attempted to “avoid 
overburdening the single monetary policy” (Bini Smaghi 2008:449), the Eurozone crisis has been and 
remains a crisis brought on by the institutional structure of fiscal policymaking at odds with the single 
currency; moreover, the crisis has exacerbated tensions between national governments and the ECB, 
restraining the maneuvers of the ECB in crisis management (Panico and Purificato 2013). Thus, even 
though the institutional mechanisms for fiscal policy are strong on paper (Cour-Thimann and Winkler 
2012), they fall prey to domestic politics swiftly and often, meaning immense constraints on the ECB in 
pursuit of its goals. Until a fiscal union comes to pass (and its likelihood grows dimmer by the day), the 
ECB will remain in conflict with the political institutions of its Member States, especially as it undertakes 
its own quasi-fiscal actions to counterbalance the policies of national governments (Belke and Polleit 
2010). 
 
4. A Critique of CBI (II): Independence from What? 
 
The reality of central banks being influenced by political institutions in their goals, policies, and 
operations, no matter how legally “independent” they may be, is a blind spot in a literature focused on 
inflationary outcomes and time-inconsistency. As noted above, the failure to analyze central banks as an 
institution within an institutional system creates difficulties in understanding what actually may be 
driving macroeconomic outcomes and whether or not this particular institutional arrangement is 
desirable. In a similar manner, the extant CBI literature has also overlooked the global institutional 
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system in which a central bank operates and how this environment limits all dimensions of its 
independence. Indeed, the conception of central bank independence derived from time-inconsistency 
models was as a way to remove political pressure from a central bank's policy decisions, anticipating 
that this pressure would come solely from incentives generated within a national economy. However, 
the experience of the past two decades shows conclusively that central banks as an institution are also 
influenced by their external environment, as well as their peer group, further calling into question just 
what a bank is supposed to be independent from. 
 
Just as central banks are limited in their own countries by the institutional system which gave them 
birth, so too have the exigencies of globalization created networks that restrain banks from truly being 
"independent." In particular, the processes of globalization have forced a convergence in policy, where 
central banks have seen a narrowing of the space for independent monetary policies, while also creating 
institutional convergence, where global institutional networks reinforce the idea of central bank 
autonomy domestically while circumscribing it internationally. These constraints have appeared not just 
in the coordination between central banks, but in the institutional system which forces such 
coordination above and beyond its constraints on policy space or national autonomy; much as occurs 
domestically, the international arena is its own institutional milieu which rewards certain actions, 
penalizes others, and consistently tempers any true independence.    
 
4.1 Policy Convergence 
In the policy realm, the convergence of monetary policies globally is not a new phenomenon, as central 
banks have always been intimately connected with the global monetary system and each other, 
especially under the Bretton Woods System. However, prior to the 1980s, the central bank acted "as yet 
another state agency, without much discretionary decision-making power” (Polillo and Guilen 
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2005:1767). Despite the Bretton Woods system being “deliberately planned, the outcome of a long 
series of negotiations between eminent economists representing the interests of critical countries” 
(Rose 2007:671), the system itself worked within narrow parameters and central bank coordination was 
not done by a class of independent bankers but by government writ large. Even the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), the international organization tasked to foster central bank cooperation 
(including a common monetary doctrine), was constrained by the domestic politics of its members, 
seeing “international cooperation hold only as long as domestic lawmakers allow[ed]” (Toniolo 
2005:11). 
 
Indeed, one should not mistake the intensive “coordination” of central banks under Bretton Woods as a 
synonym for international constraints on independent institutions, for the “independence” of central 
banks during this period consisted of duly carrying out orders to maintain the status quo, with “a group 
of central banks… managing the fixed exchange rate system in ways that their governments could not” 
via intricate swap mechanisms (Fratianni and Pattison 2001:204). While the BIS provided a technical 
forum for bankers and did indeed foster cooperation (Howell 1993), the bankers themselves remained 
on a short leash from their national Ministries with no goal independence, even during the relatively 
more independent days of the 1960s.v And with countries themselves (to say nothing of central banks) 
having “little room to conduct an autonomous domestic monetary policy” (Eijffinger and de Haan 
1996:29), the idea of there being serious international constraints on central banking, independent of 
domestic ones, is a spurious claim. As Wray (2007:122) noted, “even if U.S. domestic monetary policy 
had been relatively independent with the fixed-but-adjustable Bretton Woods exchange rates in, say, 
1960, that was in conditions of a virtually closed economy and with private capital flows across borders 




However, the collapse of Bretton Woods in the late 20th century changed this dynamic immensely. 
Whereas the Bretton Woods system was a global monetary system, created by governments and 
implemented by central bankers, its retreat allowed for globalization of trade and finance, dismantling 
of capital controls, and expansion of international financial markets; in short, a much more 
uncoordinated-by-design international monetary system. In tandem with this removal of explicit 
coordination, the move towards central bank independence gave the banks of the largest developed 
countries the ability to set monetary policy autonomously (and, not coincidentally, set the tone for the 
world’s monetary and financial conditions). The sum total of these global changes was the crafting of a 
new global financial order, replacing the planning ethos of Bretton Woods with a spontaneous 
institutional order led by central banks and not national governments (Rose 2007).  
 
Important for our purposes is the fact that this new institutional order did not free banks from domestic 
political pressures (as noted in the previous section and we will see below), although it did put its own 
pressure on domestic polities (pressures memorably described by Slaughter (2001) as "agencies on the 
loose"). Instead, this transnational institutional system reinforced domestic pressures while adding new 
international constraints, constraints which arose from the imperatives of the new global monetary 
system and the institutional networks it engendered. In particular, the uncertainty of independent banks 
conducting autonomous monetary policies created a need for coordination, as the moves of major 
central banks, acting on domestic imperatives (Rey 2015), generated spillover effects which other 
monetary authorities had to take into account.vi  Much like the new institutional order, this coordination 
was also spontaneous and was actually foisted upon nominally independent central bankers by the 
exigencies of the system; as Rajan (2015:8) notes, “international monetary policy coordination, of 
course, is unpopular among central bankers,” but “international economic competition as well as the 
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policies of a country's sociocultural peers" made such coordination crucial (Simmons and Elkins 
2004:171).  
Figure 4 - Policy Rates amongst Major Central Banks, 1999-2016 
 
Source: US Federal Reserve, European Central Bank 
The composition of this coordination has shifted from the days of Bretton Woods, and indeed provides 
more of a constraint to central banks than the fixed exchange rate system ever did. In the first instance, 
the need to prevent monetary imbalances has accelerated policy coordination in the last fifteen years 
(Taylor 2013), with harmonization of central bank policy becoming much more pronounced with the 
advent of the Euro in 1999 (itself a currency forged by harmonizing many disparate monetary policies 
under the aegis of one supranational central bank). Unlike much of the 20th century, however, this 
harmonization has come about via interest rates rather than exchange rates. As Figure 4 shows, the 
trend in the modern central bank's most important policy tool, the interest rate mechanism, has all but 
followed the same track for the ECB and the US Federal Reserve since 1999, with the Bank of Japan 
following the same trend but at a much lower level. In fact, a simple Pearson correlation between the 
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rates utilized by the Fed and the ECB over this timeframe gives a result of 0.79, an incredibly strong 
positive correlation (which is significant well beyond the 1% level). At the time that central banks were 
assuming their highest levels of legal independence from domestic politics, they were suddenly 
beginning to move in lockstep with their peers, with the Fed taking the lead.  
 
The endemic crises occurring even during the independent central bank renaissance have also created 
repeated episodes of intense and explicit policy coordination that far exceeds the technical coordination 
of Bretton Woods. As Benoit Coeure (2016:8), a member of the Executive Board of the European Central 
Bank, noted recently, such interaction is desirable, as "central banks need to be engaged in a constant 
dialogue so as to remain ready for rapid coordinated action in exceptional circumstances." During recent 
events, such as the September 11th terrorist attacks in the US and global financial crisis, concerted 
coordination was seen as a way to avoid major systemic disruption (Scotti 2006). Indeed, nowhere was 
this coordination more apparent than during the global financial crisis. Papadia (2013) expertly detailed 
the unprecedented coordination of the Fed and the ECB, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of England 
and the Bank of Japan in 2007-2009 in setting up a swap mechanism to guarantee funding. This 
mechanism allowed central banks to issue liquidity in currencies different from their own, creating a 
global network with reciprocal privileges. As Papadia (2013) correctly notes, even more so than the 
similar small-scale mechanism set up after the September 11th attacks, the swap network instituted 
during the crisis represented the first instance of "global monetary policy." 
 
4.2 Institutional Convergence 
While there are undoubtedly policy reasons which explain this move towards coordination amongst 
(ostensibly) independent central banks, this growing policy convergence has occurred precisely due to 
institutional incentives provided in the international monetary realm. In fact, the two phenomena, of 
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policy and institutional convergence, have been mutually reinforcing: as D'Amato et al. (2009:108) note, 
the "synchronicity of business cycles among countries [has been] a driving force of the institutional 
design of monetary authorities," while Cukierman (2008:726) asserts that globalization "reinforced the 
quest for price stability and raised the importance of CBI as a signal of macroeconomic nominal 
responsibility to domestic and international investors." This point was echoed for emerging markets by 
Wagner (2005:627), who noted that central bank independence became crucial for governments "in 
order to be able to sell bonds on the international financial markets, at least at a 'reasonable' price."  
 
The pressure that globalization has created for a particular type of monetary institution, the 
independent central bank, has been aided and abetted by diffusion of information across newly-opened 
networks, which also has helped forge a consensus on central bank independence. There is ample 
evidence that central banks have been consciously modeling their actions and institutional imperatives 
on others; the revision of the law of the Bank of Japan in the late 1990s, which attempted to adopt the 
“western" central bank model wholesale, is such an example (but unfortunately, as Dwyer (2004} notes, 
this move did not translate through to greater credibility). The concomitant rise in power of a supra-
national institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF}, also gave a push to the diffusion of central 
bank independence, as the IMF "increasingly attached certain conditions, including an independent 
central bank, to its lending agreements" (Polillo and Guilen 2005:1774}.  
  
In addition to formal institutional pressures, there also have been informal mechanisms at play, 
reinforcing central bank independence through "normative network pressures" (Polillo and Guillen 
2005:1778). These same network pressures, present in any group, have now moved beyond merely 
influencing institutional design and are now permeating institutional functions. In reality, the network of 
central banks and central bankers has created an informal mechanism for coordination, with personal 
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relationships and conferences forging an esprit de corps amongst central bankers (lrwin 2013). Even 
before ascending to the commanding heights of an economy, central bankers could have known each 
other via their work, given that the vast majority of central bankers come from a background within 
their own government, the financial sector, or as an economist (Adolph 2013). Additional formal 
organizations such as the Bank for International Settlements, meeting every second month and fostering 
"a collegial spirit among the members" while remaining patently "non-transparent" (Bayne 2008:11), 
reinforce these interactions, comprising a "transnational governance network" (Marcussen 2007). While 
this was true during the Bretton Woods years (Bank of Canada governor Louis Rasminsky was known to 
say that meetings in Basel were like “group therapy,” see Toniolo 2005:365), the relative impotence of 
central banks during that era meant that such meetings take on added importance today. There is also 
likely an element of competition amongst central bankers which has also facilitated the convergence of 
policies, for, as Guler et al. (2012) noted in the context of trade policy, competitors are likely to adopt 
similar patterns of behavior so as not to lose ground to others, a reality that could be motivating 
institutional policy biases as much as a worry of imbalances.  
 
4.3 The Interplay of Domestic and International Constraints 
This policy and institutional convergence amongst central banks has created an interesting dynamic 
between the international constraints on independence and those that exist in the domestic arena. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the post-crisis consensus amongst central banks on 
“unconventional monetary policy.” While central banks are never independent from the system that 
spawned them, there is a valid concern that a central bank could potentially upset a country's 
institutional balance, especially if it outpaces the same democracy that constrains it (Levy 1995). As its 
own political institution, a central bank has similar incentives in terms of staffing, budget, and power 
within the system, in addition to its own preferences regarding inflation, as other political institutions. 
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The extraordinary circumstances of the post-crisis world, and the reliance on unconventional policies, 
appears to have given banks leverage to remove their political shackles domestically, aggrandizing 
power to themselves to create inflation in many forms and transferring duties from other political 
institutions to itself as part of a broader mandate. This shift of policy would also seem to re-invigorate 
the charge that central banks have become too powerful, given that they are treading on the 
prerogatives of democratic governments: as Bibow (2013b) pointed out, "ECB policymakers are always 
quick to denounce any commentary made by politicians on monetary policy as an attack on their 
independence while happily considering it to be part of the bank's monetary policy mandate to 
notoriously call for budgetary discipline, wage restraint, and structural reform." There is no guarantee 
that such an outcome would be a subversion of democracy, for there is always a constituency for 
perpetual gain and never any pain, but the real threat may come from how such a transfer of 
responsibilities alters the political system.  
 
However, I cannot emphasize enough that central banks, as institutions, are inextricably linked with the 
polity that they emerged from, and the polity always has sanctioning mechanisms on even an 
“independent” central bank that has gone rogue (as Levy [1995] suggest). Even in an environment 
where the institutional incentives faced by central banks are skewed to working with their peer group 
internationally rather than with their fellow institutions in government, the central bank cannot escape 
the limitations that accompany being part of a domestic political structure (Bibow 2004). Indeed, the 
dirty secret accompanying the continued aggrandizement of power that central banks have taken on 
after the crisis, including an expansion of policy independence, is that such an approach has been 
generally approved by the public - a public that needed CBI to remove the temptation of inflation, but to 




Put another way, central banks have expanded their remit to look at growth, unemployment, or asset 
prices in addition to inflation in a manner that has received implicit (and in some cases, explicit) 
validation through the democratic process. One of the most obvious examples is that of US President 
Barack Obama, who, despite any economic recovery to speak of, won re-election and was able to install 
Janet Yellen, an ardent champion of central bank power, at the Federal Reserve. Similarly, even in the 
midst of the Eurozone crisis, protesters did not target the ECB but instead turned their ire on national 
governments that attempted to implement "austerity." In fact, based on a database from Bishop and 
Hoeffler (2016) on global election results, I calculate that, from 2008 to 2012 globally, 164 elections 
were held, with 116 of these elections having an incumbent stand; more importantly, the incumbent 
won 85 of these elections (approximately 73%). In Europe, which was perhaps the hardest hit by the 
global financial crisis, the numbers are slightly lower but still prove the point, as from 2008 to 2012, 32 
elections were held, 24 with an incumbent standing, and the incumbent won 14 of these (approximately 
59%). This is hardly evidence of a backlash against any type of economic policy, even though the 
governments returned might have been weakened (see Appendix B for the breakdown of the voting).  
 
How does these results matter for the supposedly "independent" central bank? As James (2010: 25) 
notes, "After the financial crisis we have become wiser. Making monetary policy is more complex. But as 
a result, it is also more politicized." Following on this point, Adolph (2013) shows that partisan influence 
on monetary policy is still alive and well, while Ennser-Jedenastik (2014) demonstrates empirically how 
the ideology of the party in power continues to matter for who is being appointed as a central bank 
governor. Thus, a change in politics should also mean a change in central bank governor, if not 
necessarily on the same schedule but eventually, in line with societal preferences. As the evidence from 
Bishop and Hoeffler (2016) showed, this was not the case, even through the worst years of the crisis, 
mainly because the politics did not change. Instead, the political institutions of democracy have been 
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able to circumvent the institutional arrangement that was designed to keep the temptation of inflation 
at bay; by returning to power the parties that appoint central bank governors and ensuring the 
institutional status quo, voters continue to endorse the efforts of central banks to deal with these same 
preferences of society, namely, for monetary approaches to what may be rather thought of as structural 
or fiscal issues. Indeed, the polities of many countries have been able to pat themselves on the back for 
fiscal prudence while shifting the same accommodative stances and preferences to the central bank. 
And while this one institution may feel that it is independent by expanding its powers internationally, in 
reality, the central bank is just playing a role that its institutional structure has already ordained.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper has examined the fortieth anniversary of the main idea underpinning the modern idea central 
bank independence, and how the focus on the concept of time-inconsistency has important flaws in its 
treatment of the central bank as an institution. Indeed, despite critiques of CBI from utilitarian, 
empirical, and policy perspectives proliferating in the literature, an analysis of central bank 
independence from an institutional angle in economics has been lacking. When such a lens is applied, 
we can see clearly that central bank independence at any level is impossible, given the political 
institutional structure from which the central bank has emerged. Democracy has created the incentives 
in place for inflation, democracy (via its various constituent actors) has expressed its own preferences 
for inflation, but, ashamed at these preferences, democracy has disingenuously tried to tie its own 
hands via an “independent” central bank. Moreover, the imperatives of globalization and the pressures 
that accrue to banks from their placement in an international institutional system create even larger 
constraints on central bank policies. Simply put, if an institution's policies are contingent on what other 
political institutions are doing, either domestically or internationally, it is difficult to say that this 
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institution is truly independent, no matter how vociferously such independence is defended at the next 
conference in Jackson Hole. 
 
But this brings us back to the original question, the one that the CBI debate neatly sidesteps, and that is 
what should a monetary institution do - and then what institutional arrangement would achieve that? 
Without opening the can of worms that is the first question, it is perhaps better to examine what CBI 
was intended to do as an institutional arrangement and how it lives up to that goal. The original thought 
animating CBI was to remove the political incentive for inflation from policymakers; the implicit 
assumption underpinning this approach is that a central bank should provide price stability, at the 
minimum, with other goals defined by the independent institution itself. However, as we have seen 
here, such an obsession on price stability is impossible so long as the central bank, any central bank, 
remains a political creature guided by the polity. If CBI is to truly live up to its own provenance, 
economists concerned with price stability must then look at other institutional arrangements to 
understand how to divorce political processes from monetary policy, if this arrangement is what is 
desired.  
 
Indeed, if the temptation to inflate is too great to be trusted to even an independent bank, due to its 
position as part of a broader institutional web, than the only way forward is to remove the oversight of 
money from political institutions entirely. Unfortunately, the likelihood of such a solution is also 
predicated on the prevailing institutional order, and in particular the acquiescence of political 
institutions. Such an eventuality is highly unlikely if we look at the experience of central bank 
independence, which held sway for only a short period and gave way to political imperatives once a 
crisis erupted. Without an ironclad and actionable political consensus on the desirability of a truly 
independent monetary arrangement, any institutional solution is thus doomed to subservience under 
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the tyranny of the majority. As a member of the Executive Board of the ECB put it, unwittingly proving 
my case, “Central bank independence needs to be continuously protected and maintained over time. 
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-10 20 0.141 0.029 0.12 0.18 
-9 9 0.300 0.085 0.25 0.45 
-8 22 0.432 0.015 0.42 0.45 
-7 72 0.377 0.136 0.24 0.65 
-6 0 n/a 
-5 5 0.274 0.257 0.10 0.73 
-4 18 0.390 0.079 0.28 0.46 
-3 20 0.589 0.203 0.33 0.83 
-2 47 0.370 0.181 0.11 0.67 
-1 21 0.417 0.130 0.10 0.56 
0 6 0.520 0.164 0.37 0.67 
1 7 0.537 0.191 0.36 0.83 
2 14 0.642 0.008 0.64 0.67 
3 20 0.476 0.207 0.18 0.893 
4 37 0.509 0.126 0.26 0.83 
5 65 0.540 0.163 0.34 0.77 
6 76 0.500 0.123 0.36 0.73 
7 60 0.526 0.169 0.16 0.68 
8 128 0.543 0.179 0.16 0.83 
9 128 0.462 0.263 0.10 0.83 
10 203 0.414 0.210 0.11 0.80 
 
Author’s calculations based on data from Polity IV and Dincer and Eichengreen (2014)












Armenia 2008 no no   Afghanistan 2009 yes yes 
Austria 2008 yes yes   Albania 2009 yes yes 
Azerbaijan 2008 yes yes   Algeria 2009 yes yes 
Bangladesh 2008 yes no   Andorra 2009 no no 
Barbados 2008 yes yes   Antigua and Barbuda 2009 yes yes 
Belize 2008 yes no   Bolivia 2009 yes yes 
Bhutan 2008 no no   Botswana 2009 yes yes 
Cambodia 2008 yes yes   Bulgaria 2009 yes no 
Canada 2008 yes yes   Congo, Rep. 2009 yes yes 
Cyprus 2008 yes no   Dominica 2009 yes yes 
Dominican Republic 2008 yes yes   Ecuador 2009 yes yes 
Georgia 2008 yes yes   El Salvador 2009 no no 
Ghana 2008 no no   Equatorial Guinea 2009 yes yes 
Grenada 2008 yes no   Gabon 2009 no no 
Italy 2008 no no   Germany 2009 yes yes 
Macedonia, FYR 2008 yes yes   Greece 2009 yes no 
Malaysia 2008 yes yes   Guinea-Bissau 2009 no no 
Maldives 2008 yes no   Honduras 2009 no no 
Malta 2008 yes yes   Iceland 2009 yes yes 
Montenegro 2008 yes yes   India 2009 yes yes 
Nauru 2008 yes yes   Indonesia 2009 yes yes 
Nepal 2008 yes no   Iran 2009 yes yes 
New Zealand 2008 yes no   Israel 2009 no no 
Pakistan 2008 no no   Japan 2009 yes no 
Paraguay 2008 no no   Kyrgyz Republic 2009 yes yes 













Serbia and Montenegro 2008 yes no   Luxembourg 2009 yes yes 
Slovenia 2008 yes no   Malawi 2009 yes yes 
Spain 2008 yes yes   Mauritania 2009 yes yes 
United States of America 2008 no no   Moldova 2009 yes yes 
Vanuatu 2008 yes no   Mongolia 2009 yes no 
Zambia 2008 no no   Mozambique 2009 yes yes 
Zimbabwe 2008 yes yes   Namibia 2009 yes yes 
 
  Norway 2009 yes yes 
  Panama 2009 no no 
  Romania 2009 yes yes 
  South Africa 2009 no no 
  Tunisia 2009 yes yes 




















Australia 2010 yes yes   Andorra 2011 yes no 
 
Egypt 2012 no no 
Azerbaijan 2010 yes yes   Argentina 2011 yes yes 
 
France 2012 yes no 
Belarus 2010 yes yes   Benin 2011 yes yes 
 
Greece 2012 no no 
Belgium 2010 no no   Cameroon 2011 yes yes 
 
Japan 2012 yes no 
Brazil 2010 no no   Canada 2011 yes yes 
 
Lesotho 2012 yes no 
Burkina 
Faso 
2010 yes yes 
  




2012 yes yes 





2011 yes yes 
 
Russia 2012 no no 
Chile 2010 no no   Chad 2011 yes yes 
 
Senegal 2012 yes no 








2012 no no 
Comoros 2010 no no 
  




2012 no no 
Costa Rica 2010 no no   Denmark 2011 yes no 
 
Turkmenistan 2012 yes yes 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
2010 yes yes 
  
Djibouti 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Ethiopia 2010 yes yes   Estonia 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Guinea 2010 no no   Finland 2011 yes no 
 
  
  Hungary 2010 no no   Gambia, the 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Latvia 2010 yes yes   Guatemala 2011 no no 
 
  
  Mauritius 2010 yes yes   Guyana 2011 no no 
 
  
  Moldova 2010 yes no   Haiti 2011 no no 
 
  
  Myanmar 2010 yes yes   Ireland 2011 no no 
 
  
  Nauru 2010 yes yes   Jamaica 2011 yes no 
 
  





























Philippines 2010 no no   Lao PDR 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Rwanda 2010 yes yes   Latvia 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Slovak 
Republic 
2010 yes no 
  
Liberia 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Solomon 
Islands 




2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Sri Lanka 2010 yes yes   Morocco 2011 yes no 
 
  
  Sudan 2010 yes yes   Nicaragua 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Suriname 2010 no no   Niger 2011 no no 
 
  
  Sweden 2010 yes yes   Nigeria 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Tanzania 2010 yes yes   Peru 2011 no no 
 
  
  Togo 2010 yes yes   Poland 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Trinidad 
and Tobago 
2010 yes no 
  
Portugal 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Tuvalu 2010 yes no   Samoa 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  Ukraine 2010 yes no   Seychelles 2011 yes yes 
 
  
  United 
Kingdom 
2010 yes no 
  
Singapore 2011 yes yes 
 
  




   




      




      




      




      




      




      




      
Zambia 2011 yes no 
 
  
  Source: Bishop and Hoefler (2016). Where they have coded a country as being in transition or as having no incumbent, I have coded it as no win for an 
incumbent.
                                                           
i
 As an anonymous reviewer astutely pointed out, it is an interesting issue of the time-inconsistency literature 
that it remains focused on financial markets for the transmission of “independent” monetary policy, but that 
the main issue of inflation is more centered on labor markets. Indeed, it is labor markets who are assumed to 
have the perfect foresight of inflation, and wage-setting is where the speedy adjustments occur which 
theoretically cancel out an inflation-prone politician’s maneuvers. 
ii
 Interestingly, this same literature found no significant relationship between output and CBI, with one paper 
(Jordan 1998) actually finding that, while average growth rates were unrelated to legal independence, high 
degrees of CBI caused real output loss during the 1980s. 
iii
 The dispersion of central bank independence by Polity IV rating is shown in Appendix A. As can be seen, 
while there is a slightly higher dispersion for the highest levels of democracy, in general, the categories follow 
a normal distribution. Thanks are due to a participant at the Cambridge Journal of Economics 40
th
 Anniversary 
Conference for suggesting including this dispersion.  
iv
 Bibow (2013a) also makes a convincing case against the existence of time-inconsistency, meaning that the 
institutional make-up of a society may have learned the necessity of adequate policies rather than just looking 
to a benevolent, yet anti-inflationary, dictator. 
v
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer who noted this correct formulation of the issue. 
vi
 In practice, this generally meant the Federal Reserve acting as the “leader of the band” in setting rates and 
emerging markets playing catch-up so as to not be left behind. Thanks are due to an anonymous referee who 
suggested the phrase “leader of the band.”  
